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OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA: A CATHOLIC
FOUNDATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Robert John Araujo, S.j t
It is exciting to be here with you as we consider and study the
foundation of human rights and the contributions from Catholic
minds. Moreover, I am delighted to be a part of a community of
scholars who recognize the extraordinary contributions of Catholic
thinkers to this crucial topic. In particular, I salute those of you who
acknowledge the significance and relevance of thinkers such as the
two Francises: de Vitoria and SuArez. I am further delighted that a
number of you have addressed their work at this conference.
Here we are, more than half a millennium later, recalling and
celebrating their pioneering work to the eminent field of human rights
that some argue is quite new.' Although for some, the events of sixty-
three years ago, when the U.N. General Assembly voted on a
resolution adopting an international charter of basic rights may seem
like an eternity ago. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in December of 1948, most individuals
have had some exposure to the phrase "human rights"-both the idea
itself as well as some application of it in their respective lives or the
lives of people with whom they are familiar. It is clear that
recognition of this idea and its implementation did not enjoy much
popular acclaim before the end of the Second World War, so it would
be understandable to assume that human rights are essentially a
product of the contemporary age subsequent to the Second World War.
This outlook was recently acclaimed in a review of Professor
Samuel Moyn's new book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in
History,2 appearing in a recent issue of the Columbia alumni
magazine. The title of the review is: "Human Rights: Newer than
t John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Professor, Loyola University Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Michael B. Shavelson, Human Rights: Newer Than You 7hink, COLUM. MAG.,
Winter 2010-2011, at 56.
2. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
3. Shavelson, supra note 1.
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You Think," and the author is quoted by the reviewer as stating that
while there were early sources of human rights discourse, the popular
concept is of recent generation. Professor Moyn is quoted as saying,
"It's not that there weren't early sources, but at the level of common
speech, the idea of international human rights doesn't become
widespread until the 1970s."5
In spite of this interesting perspective held by some contemporary
scholars, we must acknowledge that a crucial source of human rights
is to be found in the writings of Francis de Vitoria. One of his most
influential works regarding the natural law and its application to
human rights discourse is De Indis.6 By failing to understand his
contribution, it would be easy to assume that human rights concepts
and principles and the laws addressing them are products of the
contemporary age, thereby leaving Professor Moyn's position intact.
However, doing so would discount the extraordinary pioneering
work of the Neo-Scholastic scholars of the sixteenth century to whom
we owe a great debt-especially to de Vitoria.
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546)7 lived during the age of the
Conquistadors and the Reformation. He was for much of his adult
life a Dominican friar and professor of theology at Salamanca. Like
the Jesuits Suhrez and Bellarmine who were to follow, the source of
de Vitoria's legal principles dealing with human rights matters was
founded in the natural law and the method of legal reasoning that
accompanies this school of legal thought.9 It was this foundation that
led him to consider the notions of popular sovereignty and self-
determination, essentially unheard of before his time, as vital
elements of human rights doctrine.'o Moreover, he reached
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, O.P., DE INDIS, replinted in VITORA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 231
(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., 1991) [hereinafter DE INDIS]. This volume also
includes other political and legal writings authored by de Vitoria that have a bearing on the
points made in this Article.
7. C.H. McKenna, Francis of Vittoria, in 14 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 727 (1967).
8. Id
9. See generally ON LAW: LECTURES ON ST I-II 90-105, in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS,
supra note 6; see also JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 59 (Doris C.
Anson trans., 1943).
10. See, e.g., FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, O.P., ON CIVIL POWER, Q. 1, Art. 6, reprinted in
VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 6, at 17-18; see also DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, at
239-51. De Vitoria discusses the capacity of a majority of the native peoples electing to be led by
the Spanish; however, if this were the case, it would seem that a majority could just as easily
decide to retain their own system and method of governance. Seeid. Q. 3, Art. 6, at 281.
[Vol. 10:2314
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conclusions about the legitimate claims of both native peoples and
Europeans that established the foundation for fundamental rights that
are addressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Universal Declaration").
The Universal Declaration begins with an important and
remarkable claim: "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."1
Two questions immediately occur about the meaning of this passage.
The first question deals with the term dignity; the second follows and
pertains to the meaning of rights. As we shall subsequently see, de
Vitoria provided important groundwork for consideration of these
two inextricably related matters that relate dignity and rights of the
human person-God's most beloved creation-which found their
way into the Universal Declaration.
Regarding the significance of the term dignity, it cannot be
restricted to understandings that involve self-respect, self-esteem, or
pride. Those definitions would undermine the term's import insofar
as these explanations are self-relational, subjective, and focused on the
individual person vis-A-vis the individual himself or herself. Indeed,
if the term is to mean something in the context of universal human
rights (i.e., claims that are universal and proper to every member of
the human family including its most vulnerable-the unborn), it must
convey the understanding that the entitlements properly belonging to
a person are relational to others.12 This point made by de Vitoria sets
the stage for consideration of the suum cuique: the principle that
necessitates that each person is to receive his or her due.13 What is
due one person cannot be correctly understood until what is also due
others, who are in relation to the first person mentioned, is
methodically considered. This is why the idea of human rights must
be universal if they are to have both substantive content and
meaning-a point comprehended well by de Vitoria and explained in
De Indis.14 What is claimed by one must be the sort of thing that can
rightfully be claimed by others. Here we must take stock of what
Jacques Maritain, who chaired the UNESCO committee that advised
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111) A, U.N. Doc.A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
12. See, e.g., DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 3, Art. 1, at 278-84 (examining the interests of and
relations between the native peoples and the Europeans).
13. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1585 (9th ed. 2009).
14. McKenna, supra note 7, at 727-28.
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the drafting committee of the Universal Declaration, had to say about
human dignity and rights in 1943:
The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is
a person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and which
consequently is not merely a means to an end, but an end, an end
which must be treated as such. The dignity of the human person?
The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of
natural law, the human person has the right to be respected, is the
subject of rights, possesses rights. There are things which are owed
to man because of the very fact that he is man. The notion of right
and the notion of moral obligation are correlative. They are both
founded on the freedom proper to spiritual agents. If man is morally
bound to the things which are necessary to the fulfillment of his
destiny, obviously, then, he has the right to fulfill his destiny; and if
he has the right to fulfill his destiny he has the right to the things
necessary for this purpose.
De Vitoria recognized these principles offered by Maritain many
years earlier when he, de Vitoria, acknowledged that the native
peoples of the Americas were, indeed, people to whom were owed
the very same things which were owed to Europeans or, for that
matter, to anyone else.16
With this fundamental understanding of the term dignity in mind
(i.e., what is owed the human person because of the very fact that he
or she is a human person), we can proceed to defining the term rights.
Right or rights is an unpretentious word found in the daily usage of
most people. Hence, it is a term of familiarity. Yet its significance is
not always understood properly, and so it must be carefully defined
when placed in the context of the often-heard phrase "human rights."
Does it mean the ability to make any claim a person desires to make
on one's own behalf? Or must it take stock of the claims made by a
person in relation to the claims or potential claims that can be made
by others? In the context of the claims that relate to the Universal
Declaration, rights involve the qualities of the human person that
relate to that which is proper, correct, and consistent with what is just
rather than unjust. The application of objective reason has much to
do with defining rights of persons and the justification of claims made
15. MARITAIN, supra note 9, at 65 (emphasis added). As noted above, Maritain
acknowledged the role of de Vitoria in charting the concept of human rights upon the natural law.
16. SeeDE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, Art. 6, at 249-50.
[Vol. 10:2316
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about them. Rights deal with the moral dimension of human nature
and human existence and with the contexts of individual persons who
live in societies with other persons. These points are well
comprehended in de Vitoria's thinking and writing.
Thus, the right or rights claimed by a person is or are legitimate
and morally proper when justice, reason, and facts fortify and
intensify, or restrict or deny, the specific claim and its legitimacy. In
short, rights have to do with the essence of what is due the individual
person because he or she is an individual person-this is the suum
cuique in operation. And what is due the person materializes in
reality not because persons, societies, or civil authorities, or
associations, or organizations determine what is due; rather, what is
due is determined by the fact that the claimant is a person, and,
therefore, the claim must be sustained because of the inherent nature
and essence of the person and his or her accompanying human
dignity as one person who lives in the midst of other persons.
The principle of the suum cuique subsists in ancient legal precepts
with which de Vitoria was familiar. For example, there is juris
praecepta sunt haec-nos este vivere; alterum non laedere; suum
cuique tribuere-these are the precepts of the law: to live honorably;
to hurt nobody; to render everyone his due. 7 Another is a traditional
definition of justice: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus
suum cuique tribuendi-justice is a steady and unceasing disposition
to render everyone his due.' The essential concept underlying these
various formulations may be summed up in the following manner:
justice-an issue of vital importance to most understandings of
natural law (to which de Vitoria was a devoted adherent) 19-is a
critical element of legal systems and international order, particularly
those concerned with the rights and the obligations of people. In the
natural law, justice is often considered existing in the context of the
suum cuique.20 in essence, the justice that is due someone or
something relates to what is due others with whom this person shares
society and is therefore in relationship with other persons. In other
words, the justice for one cannot be determined until what is just-
what is proper, and what is improper-for others involved with the
same question or issue is considered and determined. In consequence,
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1841.
18. Id. at 1842.
19. McKenna, supra note 7, at 728.
20. See generally Rev. Robert John Araujo, S.J., Justice as Right Relationship: A
Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 377 (2000).
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what is due one person cannot be considered until what is due others
who find themselves in the same context is considered.
It should now become clear that in the framework of the most
basic examination of human rights, the suum cuique in a natural law
context plays a significant role. This is patent in the thinking and
writing of de Vitoria who assessed the claims of the native peoples of
America and the claims, often times but not always competing, of the
Spanish colonialists.21
But if the notion of rights addresses claims, it must also take stock
of duties, obligations, and responsibilities. This duties-responsibility
facet of human rights claims may seem controversial to some, but it is
a reality that de Vitoria saw and valued as he considered and
evaluated what was happening between the Europeans and the native
peoples of the Americas. 22 This responsibility, which is critical to the
meaning of rights that belong to humans, serves as the guarantor
and protector of claims made by one and all. My point about the
nexus between claims and obligations cannot be overemphasized.
The justifications underlying this point ensure that rights are
reciprocal-perhaps not in all their precise details, but reciprocal
nonetheless. In essence, then, the rights of the human person relate to
a well-ordered claim versus a disordered claim. Hence, rights claims
must always be understood next to rights obligations and
responsibilities. The nexus between rights and responsibilities is
essential to the Universal Declaration.23
There is no question that the Universal Declaration provides the
foundation for the major international human rights instruments of
the past half-century. Yet, many Americans may think with some
amusement or intrigue that it took the rest of the world another two
centuries to address the subject of human rights that seem integral to
American legal institutions. The importance to American legal
institutions is expressed, in part, in the component of the federal
Constitution known as the Bill of Rights as founded on the
Declaration of Independence. Indeed, the view that international
human rights emerged from the American Revolution and the works
of Enlightenment political philosophers, such as Locke and Rousseau,
is characteristic of the contemporary understanding of the international
21. McKenna, supra note 7, at 727.
22. SeeDE INDIS, supra note 6, at 231-92.
23. See G.A. Res. 217(111) A, supra note 11.
[Vol. 10:2318
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law texts we rely upon today in the contemporary world and its
legal academies.
However, liberty, equality, and-at least for the French-
fraternity, conceptions integral to human rights, are not solely or
firstly the work of English and French Enlightenment thinking, as was
acknowledged by Jacques Maritain.24 These important political and
legal principles have deep roots that go back in time to earlier
thinkers-especially those from the Catholic Neo-Scholastic tradition
such as de Vitoria.25 The Neo-Scholastics lived and labored during
the years of the European exploration of the New World. Their extant
writings broadly contributed to the establishment of human rights.
James Brown Scott, the distinguished American international jurist of
the early twentieth century, had often noted that de Vitoria and
SuArez, as commentators of legal and political institutions of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who relied on the Scholastic
tradition and natural law 2 6 principles, had been ahead of their times
in advancing the ideal of universal rights principles based on the
natural law. 27 But how did de Vitoria actually provide a foundation
from which the contemporary identification and understanding of
universal human rights could emerge in the twentieth century? In
particular, how do his insights assist us today to understand what
human rights are about?
24. SeegenerallyMARITAIN, supra note 9.
25. SeeDE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, Art. 1, at 239-40.
26. For an extremely helpful explanation of the role of natural law in international law, see
James V. Schall, S.J., Natural Law and the Law ofNations: Some Theoretical Considerations, 15
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 997 (1991-1992). In particular, this author states:
[T]he law of nations itself was a necessary derivative from natural law. It was based
on the principle that human beings throughout time and space were the same in their
essential structure, in that they each possessed reason, and that reason could be
formulated, communicated, understood, and debated wherever men sought
understanding. The theories and actions of anyone, even rulers, could and should be
tested by reason. This testing would result in an agreed upon law if the reasonable
solution could be found. It would result in violence, disagreement, and even war if it
could not.
Id. at 1017.
27. See John P. Doyle, Francisco Suarez: On Preaching the Gospel to People Like the
American Indians, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 879 (1991-1992); Ram6n HernAndez, O.P., The
Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Dommgo de Soto, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1031
(1991-1992); see generally JAMES BROWN Scorr, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2000) (1934); JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: LECTURES ON
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA [1480-1546] AND FRANCISCO SUAREZ [1548-1617] (1928).
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These issues and the answers to them are critical to the welfare of
human rights as ye consider the fact that some present day advocates
of "human rights" claim positions that violate fundamental claims
protected by the Universal Declaration including family matters,
religious freedom, and conscience, the right to emigrate, and the most
essential right of all-the right to life-the right that guarantees all
other human rights.28 What is at stake is the solidarity of each
member of the human family with all others. This is a point that de
Vitoria realized and expressed in his writings.2 9
An important and relevant illustration of solidarity and human
rights that are addressed in the Universal Declaration and that
establish cornerstones of contemporary international law is the
Charter of the United Nations. As is stated in the Charter, a major
purpose for the United Nations Organization is to "achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human ights and for
fundamental freedoms for all."3 0 It should come as no surprise that in
the advancement of universal human rights, "friendly relations
between nations" is essential, and states "in cooperation with the
United Nations" must pledge themselves to "universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 31 These
are principles that are quickly identifiable in the work of de Vitoria as
he addressed the peaceful relations between the peoples of the New
World and those of Europe.32 Both peoples had, in his estimation,
legitimate claims which might lead to conflict. Because of their
respective claims and the potential for conflict, it follows that both
groups also possessed responsibilities owed to the other. Through
recognition of these responsibilities, both sides had the capacity to
defuse the potential for conflict. Again, De Indis illustrates de
Vitoria's awareness of these matters and how the recognition of
28. See DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, Art. 6, at 250; id. Q. 2, Art. 4, at 269, 271; id. Q. 3, Art. 1,
at 278.
29. For example, de Vitoria addresses the respective legitimate claims of the native peoples
and the Spanish and suggests a type of dependency or need for the two to collaborate and
cooperate with one another. See id. Q. 3, Art. 1, at 278 -84.
30. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added).
31. G.A. Res. 217(111) A, supra note 11, pmbl.
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
320 [Vol. 10:2
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respective responsibilities could alleviate the tensions between the
two groups and thus avert conflict."
What is often overlooked today in most discussions of "human
rights" is the fundamental question: What are they, i.e., what
is essential to and what is constitutive of a "human right"? Another
question quickly follows: Who or what confers them? A third ensues:
What is their source? These questions can be answered by
considering the jurisprudence contained in the natural law, which
informed de Vitoria and his fellow Neo-Scholastics and which
inspired the jurisprudential thinking of de Vitoria and many others
since his time.34 While they did not acknowledge the source, I
am confident that it was, surely in part, natural law reasoning that
enabled the drafters to agree on the rights identified in the
Universal Declaration.3 5
What the natural law is and what constitutes it are matters that
must be addressed here and which have a bearing on the title of my
address-a debt to de Vitoria. But de Vitoria himself was in debt to
the institution of natural law. In the Roman Catholic intellectual
tradition from which I speak, it is in considerable part a means by
which the human mind formulates legal principles-the positive,
human law-that can then be applied to govern a specific subject
matter or jurisdiction. In essence, the natural law is planted within
the objective reasoning process innate to the human person which
enables and equips the person to develop a just positive-i.e.,
human-law. The positive/posited law will then be imbued with the
essential substantive principles that are desirable for the just
governing of society in which rights and responsibilities coexist side
33. See id.
34. SeeDE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, Art. 1, at 239; id. Q. 1, Art. 3, at 244-45; id. Q. 2, Art. 1,
at 254; id. Q. 2, Art. 2, at 260; id. Q. 2, Art. 3, at 264; id. Q. 2, Art. 4, at 269; id. Q. 2, Art. 5, at 273-
74; id. Q. 3, Art 1, at 278-81; id. Q. 3, Art. 2, at 284; id. Q. 3, Art. 6, at 288.
35. Jacques Maritain, who chaired the UNESCO symposium that provided the drafters of
the Universal Declaration with background perspectives on human rights, once said, "It is
related that at one of the meetings of a [UNESCO] National Commission where [h]uman [rights
were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently
opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. 'Yes,' they said, 'we agree about the
rights but on condition that no one asks us why.' That 'why' is where the argument begins."
Jacques Maritain, Introduction to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/PHS/3(rev.)
at 1 (July 25, 1948) (emphasis added).
36. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
37. See generally HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998).
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by side. This juxtaposition, in turn, enables people to flourish in
ordered societies. It is this ordering that is inclined to bring harmony
to the specific society for which the positive law was made. Reliance
on the natural law provides assistance to individuals and their civil
society as they seek that which is publicly and privately good. In the
end, the inevitable human law product of natural law reasoning
should be a society in which individuals live together in peace and
prosperity because this fundamental type of reasoning is inclined to
seek virtue and to eschew vice.
How does the natural law and its reasoning process on which de
Vitoria relied so often accomplish this? Answers can be found from
the works of those who have labored in this vineyard over the
centuries. Professor Charles Rice acknowledges that natural law is a
"guide to individual conduct" and "serves as a standard for the laws
enacted by the state."" The celebrated Canonist Gratian, who
compiled his collection of juridical principles during the twelfth
century, notes in the Decretum that, "Natural law is common to all
nations because it exists everywhere through natural instinct, not
because of any enactment."3 9 In his commentary (the "Ordinary
Gloss"), Gratian explains that the natural quality of law means "an
instinct of nature proceeding from reason."4 0 In the Summa
T12eologiae, Thomas Aquinas identifies natural law as those precepts
that are "appointed by reason."4' The first principle of this practical
reason is this: "[Glood is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided." 42 Aquinas also notes in his discussion of the natural law
38. CHARLES RICE, FIFrY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED
IT 33 (1995).
39. GRATIAN: THE TREATISE ON LAWS (Decretum DD. 1-20) WITH THE ORDINARY GLOSS 6
(Augustine Thompson, O.P. & James Gordley trans., 1993). He then went on to define "civil
law" as that which "each people and each commonwealth establishes as its own law for divine
or human reasons." Id. at 7. The law of nations was given the explanation that "almost all
nations make use of it," and it
deals with the occupation of habitations, with building, fortification, war, captivity,
servitude, postliminy [the law under which something lost as a result of captivity is
restored to the original owner from whom the item was taken], treaties, armistices,
truces, the obligation of not harming ambassadors, and the prohibition of marriage
with aliens.
Id.
40. Id at 6.
41. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, Q. 94, Art. 1 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICAl; see also
id. Pt. I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2 (arguing that practical reason is a self-evident principle).
42. Id. Pt. I-1I, Q. 94, Art. 2 (emphasis omitted). As Ralph McInerny has stated:
[Vol. 10:2322
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that, "other matters of law are ordained to the moral common
good."4 3 The notion of the common good that is essential to this
discussion might be characterized in the following manner: the good
for each person must take stock of the good for the other person-this
is indispensable to a proper understanding of human rights that must
include a sense of reciprocity in which the Silver Rule44 ["Do to no one
what you yourself dislike"] and the Golden Rule45 ["Do to others
whatever you would have them do to you"] have a role.
Aquinas also considers the common good-a vital element of the
natural law thinking that strongly influenced de Vitoria.46 In the
context of Aquinas, the object of justice is to keep people together in a
society in which they share not only relationships with one another
but relations that are right, i.e., righteous. As he states, "justice is
concerned only about our dealings with others."47  The notion of
justice as being the mutuality or reciprocity shared among the
members of society and essential to the dignity of each person was
further refined by Aquinas when he argued that "the virtue of a good
citizen is general justice, whereby [each person] is directed to the
common good." 48
Natural law is a dictate of reason. Precepts of natural law are rational directives
aiming at the good for man. The human good, man's ultimate end, is complex, but
the unifying thread is the distinctive mark of the human, i.e., reason; so too law is a
work of reason. Man does not simply have an instinct for self-preservation. He
recognizes self-preservation as a good and devises ways and means to secure it in
shifting circumstances.
Ralph McInerny, The Principles ofNatural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (1980).
43. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 41, Pt. I-I, Q. 94, Art. 3; see also id. Pt. I-I, Q. 95, Art. I
(discussing human law).
44. Tobit4:15 (New American Bible).
45. Matthew 7:12 (New American Bible); see also Luke 6:31 (New American Bible).
46. See, e.g., John F. Morris, The Contribution of Francisco de Vitoria to the Scholastic
Understanding of the Prbciple of the Common Good, 78 MODERN SCHOOLMAN 9 (2000).
47. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 41, Pt. II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2.
48. Id. Pt. I-II, Q. 58, Art. 6. In his first encyclical, Summi Pontificatus, Pope Pius XII
developed this theme on the eve of the Second World War when he stated that
it is the noble prerogative and function of the State to control, aid and direct the
private and individual activities of national life that they converge harmoniously
towards the common good. That good can neither be defined according to arbitrary
ideas nor can it accept for its standard primarily the material prosperity of society, but
rather it should be defined according to the harmonious development and the natural
perfection of man. It is for this perfection that society is designed by the Creator as
a means.
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While legal theorists may express some disagreement about
whether moral considerations are to be considered in legal theory (for
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes' great critique comes to mind 4 9),
there is little dispute about the role that reason and objective
reasoning have to play in legal theory. Reason and cognitive function
have played a crucial role in the evolution of law, and they have
been prominent participants in natural law philosophy. Aquinas
acknowledges that law may be understood as "an ordinance of reason
for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community. .. .,,5o Reason-also something of crucial concern to the
Neo-Scholastics such as de Vitoria-continues to play an important
role in legal theory and practice. Inevitably, the use of reason-
reason that is right because it is righteous-leads the legal thinker to
the notion of the common good-a principle that supports and
reinforces the existence of law that is concerned with the
identification and protection of authentic human rights.
What is presented here is only a small portion, i.e., a tip of the
iceberg, of the history of legal philosophy and legal theory that
pertains to the initiation and development of human rights
jurisprudence and the natural law foundation upon which this
jurisprudence is built. Thus, my modest contribution is intended to
introduce readers to the fact that international law, which is the
source of human rights law as we know it today, has a strong
foundation in the natural law tradition.52 Of course, de Vitoria was
steeped in this foundation. As Pope Pius XII, a seasoned diplomat of
the first half of the twentieth century, notes in his first encyclical,
Summi Pon tifica tus,
the new order of the world, of national and international life, must
rest no longer on the quicksands of changeable and ephemeral
standards that depend only on the selfish interests of groups and
Pope Pius XII, Sumni Pontificatus [Encyclical Letter on the Unity of Human Society] 1 59 (1939)
[hereinafter SummiPontificatus].
49. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918).
50. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 41, Pt. I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4.
51. A review of classical and contemporary writings on natural law will demonstrate the
connection between natural law and the common good. This illustration comes out of the
adoption of the 1787 Constitution of the United States, and the impact of John Locke. See JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 73 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1997) (1690); see also
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
52. See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF PEACE 16-25 (Sir Humphrey Waldock et al. ed., 6th ed. 1963).
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individuals. No, they must rest on the unshakable foundation, on
the solid rock of natural law and of Divine Revelation.53
De Vitoria recognized the wisdom of the natural law, and this is why
he saw the pressing need for both European and native peoples to
encounter one another in peace so that their families and their lives
could prosper in the authentic exercise of self-determination.5 4
Indeed, de Vitoria's training embraced the spirit of St. Matthew's
Gospel-to go forth and teach all nations, "baptizing them in the
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the holy Spirit."" But he
did not see this scriptural exhortation posing a threat to the ordered
relationship between native peoples and Europeans. It is evident that
de Vitoria asked himself the question: are the native peoples of the
newly discovered worlds and who are being engaged by Europeans
for the first time willing to accept the faith that I wish to give?56 This
question led him to ask and then answer many more about the status
of native people and to explore what might be their due. Some
Europeans of de Vitoria's time obviously held the view that the native
peoples were not due anything because they were not Europeans;
therefore they could be subjugated and enslaved, and their wealth
and property could be confiscated. Although others of his more
enlightened compatriots thought that while subjugation or
enslavement was not proper, they concluded that there was nothing
wrong in imposing Christianity upon the native peoples. However,
de Vitoria saw things very differently because his perspective was
thoroughly permeated by the objective reasoning of the natural law
and the existence of human dignity that belongs to all, including the
native peoples. His answers to the questions surrounding the status
of the native peoples and their due most likely astonished many of his
contemporaries. Yet almost half a millennium later, his views still
make an extraordinary and necessary contribution to human rights
discourse of the present age.
A fundamental assertion that de Vitoria makes in De Indis is the
fact that the native peoples of the so-called New World are not a
savage or subhuman race but are individuals and human persons
who, like their fellow Europeans, were created in the divine image of
53. SummiPontificatus, supra note 48, 1 82.
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55. Matthew 28:19 (New American Bible). De Vitoria quotes this scripture passage at the
beginning of De Indis. See DE INDIS, supra note 6, at 233.
56. SeeDE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 2, Art. 4, at 265-72.
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God." In short, they had the right to make the same claims based on
human dignity as did their European contemporaries. In asserting
this claim, they possessed the right to life and to human existence as
much as anyone else. This deduction led de Vitoria to other
conclusions that were not universally shared by his fellow Europeans.
For example, the native peoples had property which could not be
removed by force but only by consent.58 The conclusions he makes
about the rights and dignity of the human person helped to establish
some principles vital to the foundation of human rights doctrines that
would be articulated in the Universal Declaration and then codified in
subsequent human rights instruments of the twentieth century. We
are in enormous debt to him.
He paved the way for recognition of the universality of rights by
extending to the native peoples what the "civilized" European
claimed as his due. I emphasize the modifier universality, which is
tied to the suum cuique. De Vitoria reached conclusions that were
remarkable for his day because they foreshadowed formal
declarations about and codifications of the human rights many years
later in the twentieth century. In this regard, if principles of the
Universal Declaration set in motion elements of human rights
doctrine codified in subsequent juridical instruments, then it is the
work of de Vitoria that often serves as the springboard for what is
contained in the Universal Declaration.
De Vitoria's perspective is remarkably invigorating on another
front in that it does not portray any particular individual or group as
being solely victim or victimizer. For example, while critical of some
actions taken by some Europeans in the New World, he
acknowledges that they have some rights in trying to encounter that
which is new to them-in short, the Europeans had a reasonable and
justifiable claim to explore and meet new peoples such as the New
World and the native peoples that lived there.5 9 This is a truth about
human nature that is often lost in today's discourse on rights. Thus, it
is important to take stock of how de Vitoria considers the rights of
both the native peoples and the Europeans while at the same time
acknowledging their respective duties or responsibilities to one
another. De Vitoria, in essence, got it: there can be no rights without
57. Id. Q. 1, Art. 5, at 249 (discussing a child bearing the image of God). If the child does, it
would seem that the native person would bear God's image as well.
58. See id. Q. 2, at 251-52.
59. See id. Q. 3, Arts. 1-2, at 278-86.
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attendant responsibilities. What were some of the ways in which he
expressed this crucial insight?
We first begin with how he understands the native peoples and
whether they are, from his way of thinking, the equals of the
Europeans in fundamental and essential ways. De Vitoria concludes
that the native peoples are rational human beings quite capable of
their own self-determination.6 0 Because of this, the native peoples are
the masters of their dominions and the owners of the property they
use. The European could come to the native not as conqueror but as
bearer of things-religion, education, commerce-that could contribute
to the lives of the native people if they, the indigenous people, so
elected. 6 1  His views may have inspired several popes from the
fifteenth through the twentieth centuries when they issued encyclicals
urging Europeans and people of European heritage to desist in their
enslavement of native peoples.62
While it would be permissible for the Europeans to claim and
secure uninhabited territories for the sovereign back home, the
European explorer could not dispossess the natives of their lands,
their culture, and their way of life in the name of an alleged superior
civilization. Some Europeans thought otherwise, but de Vitoria did
not. Doing so would be akin to the error identified by Pius XII in his
encyclical Summi Pontificatus when he declared:
[I]t is indispensable for the existence of harmonious and lasting
contacts and of fruitful relations, that the peoples recognize and
observe these principles of international natural law which regulate
their normal development and activity. Such principles demand
60. Seeid. Q. 1, at 250-51; id Q. 3, Art. 6, at 288-89.
61. Seeid. Q. 3, Art. 2, at 284-86.
62. See, eg., Pope Paul III, Sublimus Di[ 4 (1537), availableathttp:/ /www.papalencyclicals.net/
Paul03/p3subli.htm (on file with the Ave Maria Law Review). While noting that Christians
were encouraged by Jesus to "Go ye and teach all nations," he stated that in any missionary
activities, Christians must acknowledge that "the Indians are truly men and that they are not
only capable of understanding the Catholic Faith but, according to our information, they desire
exceedingly to receive it." The Pope hastened to add that, "the said Indians and all other people
who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the
possession of their property . . . that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their
liberty and the possession of their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the
contrary happen, it shall be null and have no effect." Id. Other popes reiterated the concerns of
Paul III during their pontificates. For example, in 1435, Eugene IV condemned the slave trade
occurring in the Canary Islands; subsequent popes such as Urban VIII (Bull of April 22, 1639),
Benedict XIV (Bull of December 20, 1741), and Gregory XVI (Constitution Against the Slave
Trade, November 3, 1839) did the same. For a collection of these documents, see JOHN EPPSTEIN,
THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 418-26 (1935).
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respect for corresponding rights to independence, to life and to the
possibility of continuous development in the paths of civilization.6 3
A second very important point is de Vitoria's declaration on the
universality of rights.64 In defense of this position, he relied on the
scriptural account of Jesus telling the lawyer the parable of the Good
Samaritan and responding to the question: "who is my neighbor?" 65
As de Vitoria notes, the response to the lawyer's question of "who is
my neighbor?" is this-everyone is my neighbor.6 6 In this, we also see
the relational aspect of rights which de Vitoria knew was essential to
their sustainability.
A third crucial point advanced by de Vitoria focuses on the issue
concerning the relation between the native and the alien.6 7 If people
are peace-loving, they are entitled to call some place of their choosing
home. Within this discussion, de Vitoria offers his views on the
freedom of movement of one person into the territory of another.
Assuming that the traveler has no ill purpose in mind, the ability of
the traveler to enter and meet and deal with the local peoples was
another of the rights supported by natural reason. Thus, he identified
the legitimacy of peaceful exploration of the Europeans.68 Once again
taking account of the times in which he lived and wrote, de Vitoria
articulates clearly the notions about human rights and obligations of
every person that are widely acknowledged today in relevant human
rights instruments.
The concept of "self-determination" is important to natural law
theory. It also enjoys a protected status in the world of international
law.6 9 It is a notion that synthesizes the interests of the individual and
relates them to those of the community." The interests of both
converge on the ability of individuals to exercise their selections about
how they wish to live their lives and to be free from the interference
63. SunmiPon/ificatus, supra note 48, [ 74.
64. See DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 3, Art. 1, at 279.
65. Luke 10:25 -37 (New American Bible).
66. See DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 3, Art. 1, at 279.
67. See id. at 278 -79.
68. Seeid.
69. For helpful background discussion about "self-determination" as a right encompassing
the practice of self-government, see Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1993).
70. For a current and careful examination of "self-determination" as principle and right,
see ANTOmo CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 141 (1995).
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and imposition of others. Professor Brownlie has noted the overlap
of interests between the individual and the identifiable group.7 2 He
defined self-determination as "the right of cohesive national groups
('peoples') to choose for themselves a form of political organization
and their relation to other groups."7 3 It is vital to note here that these
ideas were emphasized time and again by de Vitoria in his advocacy
for the rights of the native peoples whom the Europeans could
encounter in peace and brotherhood but not in efforts to subjugate
174
or enslave.
This Catholic voice of the Neo-Scholastics is certainly a part of our
legal discourse today concerning the importance and role of human
rights. But it is challenged by other views that are purely of human
origin, an origin that does not go beyond the self which made it. In
one sense the self can turn to the voice of the surrounding culture.
But what happens when that culture is riddled with error-error that
belittles or denies the rights which belong to every person created in
God's image.75 One does not have to think too long or too hard about
those legal cultures that were based not on the transcendent
principles inscribed on the human heart and discoverable by the
natural reason of the mind, but, rather on human whim and caprice.
That which is purely of human origin can be flawed. However, the
refreshing tonic that can make the world a better place for not just
some but all remains within our grasp-especially if we ponder the
wisdom of individuals like de Vitoria. He has shown the way; let us
acknowledge our debt to him.
71. See generally Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
72. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (5th ed. 1998) ("It is
not necessarily the case that there is a divorce between the legal and human rights of groups, on
the one hand, and individuals, on the other.").
73. Id. Brownlie continues by stating, "The choice may be independence as a state,
association with other groups in a federal state, or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary (non-
federal) state." Id. As Professor Cassese has pointed out, "there is no self-determination without
democratic decision-making." CASSESE, supra note 70, at 54.
74. See DE INDIS, supra note 6, Q. 1, Art. 1, at 239-40.
75. See Genesis 1:27 (New American Bible).
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